Those not intimately familiar with SD are unlikely to recognize that it is rooted in an uneasy late twentieth century political and philosophical compromise reached between the modern-era forces of Marxism and capitalism 10 which commentators have spiritedly debated and referred to as the 'Third Way.' 11 12 13 Indeed, SD has been explicitly hailed as a "progressive alternative to neoliberalism in the twenty-first century." 14 The resultant compromise embodied the European post-modernist movement's key precepts that had evolved broadly since WWII which rejected the Enlightenment-era science, economics, law and political philosophies upon which America's founding principles are based. 15 The precautionary principle's philosophical underpinnings, for example, are closely related to post-modernism. It focuses on the uncertainties surrounding the intrinsic hazards to human health and the environment posed by novel technologies and industrial substances and activities rather than upon the risks that specific uses, dosages and exposures thereof/to actually engender. It also reverses the legal burden of proof from government to show harm to economic actors to show safety, and reduces the scientific and legal threshold needed to establish harm for regulatory purposes from causation to correlation. Consequently, the precautionary principle directly challenges the conventional modern scientific paradigm that requires high strength of causal evidence, 16 thereby enabling greater and more frequent and disproportionate federal agency regulation of economic and technological activities at the expense of individualism and private property rights. It also has prompted foreign governments to suspend intellectual property right protections to U.S. innovations in order foster broader dissemination and transfer of environmental technologies in service to SD. 17 
II.

U.S. Government-Backed International Sustainable Development Initiatives
SD had first been officially embraced and promoted within the United States at the national and international levels via the former Clinton Administration's President's Council on Sustainable Development (CSD) 18 and related CSD Task Forces 19 and Reports, 20 and National Security Strategy which had called for promotion of SD abroad. 21 It has since been reaffirmed and expanded by the Obama Administration's National Security Strategy calling for acceleration of SD, 22 Presidential Policy Directive on Global Development calling for promotion of SD internationally 23 ("HUD") 31 and Transportation 32 ("DOT") 33 and the Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA"). 34 These White House and Federal agency initiatives have encouraged participation by private and public nongovernmental organizations ("NGOs") such as the International Council for Local Environmental Initiatives 35 ("ICLEI") 36 (which later changed its name and focus for funding purposes to the more broadly orientated "ICLEI -Local Governments for Sustainability"), 37 and the International City/County Management Association 38 ("ICMA"). 39 While these entities have since become leading organizers of local sustainability initiatives in the United States, other national NGOs, as well, have engaged in such endeavors. They include inter alia the American Public Works Association 40 ("APWA"), 41 the American Water Works Association "AWWA"), the American Planning Association ("APA"), 43 the National League of Cities 44 ("NLC") and the National Association of Counties ("NAC"). 45 During the past six years, in furtherance of a progressive environment-first SD policy agenda, the Obama Administration has ensured that federal agencies directly and indirectly subsidize such entities' activities. For example, HUD has promoted ICLEI's Sustainability Planning Toolkit 46 and Clean Air and Climate Protection (CACP) Software (recently replaced by ICLEI's ClearPath suite of software tools). 47 EPA, meanwhile, has underwritten and popularized ICLEI's co-authored climate change Adaptation Guidebook 48 and co-developed Local Government Greenhouse Gas Protocol. 49 In addition, HUD and EPA have together funded or supported ICMA's Rural and Sustainable Communities Projects, 50 Local Government Environmental Assistance Network ("LGEAN"), 51 and national Brownfields Conference.
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Clearly, the Obama Administration has remained aware, based on ICLEI's prior experience, how the federal funding of state and local public and private SD initiatives is critical to their success. 53 
III.
Federalism Jurisprudence Shows How Local Sustainable Development Initiatives Can Ultimately Strengthen Executive Authority
a. Judicial Deference to Legislative and Executive Expertise
The U.S. government's SD initiatives have succeeded, in part, because of the Clinton and Obama Administrations' close management of the federal bureaucracy, previous Congress' practice of enacting ambiguous legislation (including the Clean Air and Water Acts) that delegated broad interpretive authority to the EPA, and the federal judiciary's prior and continued deference to executive agency regulations implementing such legislation deemed to be a permissible construction of the statute. In other words, the Obama Administration, like the Clinton Administration preceding it, has learned from U.S. federalism jurisprudence how to strengthen the Executive Branch's hand in state and local SD policymaking without attracting much, if any, congressional or judicial oversight.
The concept of federalism connotes a 'system of power-sharing" between a larger political unit and its smaller constituent but partially independent political subdivisions. 54 More specifically, the Obama Administration has relied on the remnants of New Deal-era Modern Federalism, 55 56 which had expanded rapidly during the period of former President Johnson's "Great Society" 57 with the assistance of former U.S. Supreme Court Chief Justice Earl Warren. New Deal-era Modern Federalism had reflected a political consensus "mandating judicial restraint and deference to Congressional and Executive legislative and policy judgments." 58 The U.S. Supreme Court thereafter led by former Chief Justice Warren Burger had upheld this consensus approximately a half a century later to limit judicial oversight of legislative, and consequently, executive decision-making with its seminal decision in Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 59 which has since been expanded by subsequent Supreme Courts. In Chevron, the Court held that where "Congress has not directly addressed the precise question at issue, the court does not simply impose its own construction on the statute, as would be necessary in the absence of administrative interpretation. Rather, if the statute is silent or ambiguous…the question for the court is whether the agency's answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute." 60 b.
Legislative 63 the Court had permissively construed the Tenth Amendment "as not depriving the national government of authority to resort to all means for the exercise of a granted power which are appropriate and plainly adapted to the permitted end." 64 The U.S. Supreme Court led by former Chief Justice William Rehnquist also had largely upheld this consensus more than half a century later to limit states' ability to enact laws that directly interfered/conflicted with Congress' and the President's authority, respectively, to conduct foreign affairs, in the cases of Crosby v. NFTC 65 and American Insurance Ass'n v. Garamendi. 66 67 In Crosby, the State of Massachusetts had enacted a law precluding state and local government agencies from conducting business with companies engaged in business in Burma, notwithstanding various legislative and executive actions that Congress and the president had already taken to restrict U.S. government funding of UN activities financing Burma and other forms of direct non-humanitarian aid to Burma, and to prohibit new investment in Burma by 'United States persons.' 68 69 The Supreme Court held that, since the Massachusetts law had conflicted with these actions and congressional legislation had vested the president, in the interest of national security, with the discretion to suspend or continue sanctions depending on Burma's progress on human rights, it was preempted by the Constitution's Supremacy Clause.
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In Garamendi, the State of California had enacted the Holocaust Victim Insurance Relief Act (HVIRA), "requiring any insurer doing business in the state to disclose information about all policies sold in Europe between 1920 and 1945." 71 The U.S. Supreme Court held the California law unconstitutional on preemption grounds because there was "a sufficiently clear conflict between HVIRA and the "consistent presidential policy to encourage voluntary settlement funds and disclosure of policy information [via executive agreements with Germany, Austria, and France] in preference to litigation or coercive sanctions." 72 The Court reasoned that, "the President possesses considerable independent constitutional authority to act on behalf of the United States on international issues…and conflict with the exercise of that authority is a comparably good reason to find preemption of state law." 73 The Court, in effect, categorized the result in Garamendi as "preemption by executive conduct in foreign affairs." 74 The Supreme Court's decisions in Crosby and Garamendi have since influenced lower federal court rulings, such as that of the Illinois federal district court in NFTC v. Giannoulias. 75 In Giannoulias, the court issued a permanent injunction precluding the State of Illinois from enforcing the Illinois Act to End Atrocities and Terrorism in the Sudan, 76 because it had found that the law conflicted with and was broader than the Federal Sudan policy. 77 c.
Evolved 86 It concluded that, "under our federal system," the criminal remedy for rape which Petitioner had sought "must be provided by the Commonwealth of Virginia and not by the United States." 87 88 d.
Evolved the Rehnquist Court's subsequent nonbinding discussion of that opinion in Garamendi, and the Roberts Court's more recent holding in Medellín v. Texas. Considered together, these cases arguably strengthen states' ability to adopt local SD initiatives over which the President ultimately has last word that can help to shape U.S. foreign affairs consistent with Executive Branch policymaking.
Zschernig had involved an Oregon statute providing for the escheat of the personal property of nonresident aliens who had died intestate unless certain prescribed conditions were satisfied. 90 The majority opinion written by former Justice William Douglas had held that the Oregon law was unconstitutional because it entailed the "kind of state involvement in foreign affairs and international relations […] which the Constitution entrusts solely to the Federal Government." 91 Although Justice Harlan agreed with the Court's conclusion on the ground that a treaty, by virtue of the Constitution's Supremacy Clause, preempted the Oregon law, 92 he objected to its rationale. His concurring opinion argued that the Oregon statute was constitutional on the basis of prior Court precedents "establish [ing] that, in the absence of a conflicting federal policy or violation of the express mandates of the Constitution, the States may legislate in areas of their traditional competence even though their statutes may have an incidental effect on foreign relations" (emphasis added). 93 In Garimendi, the Court's majority more closely examined how the rule former Justice Harlan had previously articulated in Zschernig would apply. The Court, in dicta, opined that where "state legislation will produce something more than incidental effect in conflict with express foreign policy of the National Government," but nevertheless falls "within 'areas of...traditional competence' [,…] it would be reasonable to consider the strength of the state interest, judged by standards of traditional practice, when deciding how serious a conflict must be shown before declaring the state law preempted" (emphasis added). 94 Several legal commentators have concluded that the Court had effectively established a new "balancing test comparing the degree of conflict with the extent of the state's interest." 95 In their view, this test, which required a "two-step inquiry," 96 did not strengthen states' rights. Rather, it potentially broadened the Court's holding in Zscherning by eliminating "its inquiry into the 'direct' or 'incidental' effects of state laws on foreign relations," 97 thereby indirectly expanding the power of the President via executive agreements to unilaterally preempt state laws (without congressional approval) that conflict with his/her conduct of foreign affairs. 98 In 106 and in "protecting the honor and integrity of the Nation" in international affairs more generally. 107 
IV.
Examples of State and Local Sustainable Development Initiatives Enabled by Evolving Federalism Jurisprudence
To recall, evolving U.S. Supreme Court federalism jurisprudence has arguably encouraged subnational governments to incorporate a number of domestic and international SD principles into state and local regional compacts, development plans, codes, ordinances, standards and community initiatives, and to consequently, make an impact upon domestic and foreign affairs.
The following examples illustrate this point. 110 -have implemented local ordinances that incorporate the provisions of […] (CEDAW) into local law (known as "CEDAW ordinances"). These ordinances address discrimination against women broadly, as well as the prevention of violence against women specifically." 111 The Obama Administration has clearly expressed its support for local implementation of CEDAW. 112 A number of other municipalities have adopted CEDAW resolutions based on the model proposed by the U.S. Conference of Mayors, 113 supporting U.S. ratification of CEDAW and calling for city councils to adopt ordinances incorporating CEDAW principles into local law In addition to these illustrative examples, since, at least 2005, U.S. state and local governments have proposed and/or adopted numerous other SD-related initiatives, many of which have been modeled after similar European Union initiatives and incorporated into local law. All of these SD initiatives are premised, as a matter of science and law, on Europe's post-modernist precautionary principle, and they are intended, in the absence of causal evidence of harm to human health and the environment, to ensure environmental protection of the air, oceans and domestic navigable waters and to curtail the use of intrinsically harmful substances, products, technologies and industrial activities. These include inter alia: 1) biotech-related food, feed, and seed products and technologies; 2) hazardous substances such as high volume toxic chemicals, cosmetics, brominated flame retardants and the products containing them, metals found in appliances and electronics without the collection, recycling, and disposal of such e-waste; and 3) fossil fuels and fossil-fuel-derivatives, in favor of renewable sources of solar, wind and biomass energy. 126 Lastly, the traditional "dominance and control" local authorities have exercised over land use and zoning has begun to wane. State and city governments have increasingly commenced climate change and other SD-related initiatives that have resulted in the promotion and mandating of "'green building' development," the "overrid[ing of] local zoning laws that interfere with green development," and the invalidation of "local zoning restrictions that limit the ability of landowners to use solar panels, wind turbines, and other sources of renewable energy." 127 
V.
Conclusion: Local Sustainability Initiatives Potentially Increase Executive Authority and States' Rights at the Expense of Individual Liberty
As previously discussed, the U.S. Supreme Court, in New York v. United States, ruled that "Congress may not 'commandeer' state regulatory processes by ordering states to enact or administer a federal regulatory program." 128 In addition, former Justice Sandra Day O'Conner, the opinion's author, also emphasized that "'State officials cannot consent to the enlargement of the powers of Congress beyond those enumerated in the Constitution'" 129 Apparently sensing that states could be co-opted by an ambitious Congress and/or President at the expense of the natural law freedoms recognized in the Bill of Rights and the equal protection under the law guaranteed by the 14 th Amendment, 130 Justice O'Conner declared that U.S. constitutional federalism is intended to ensure the supremacy of individual liberty over the rights of the states and the federal government. "The Constitution does not protect the sovereignty of States for the benefit of the States or state governments as abstract political entities, or even for the benefit of the public officials governing the States. To the contrary, the Constitution divides authority between federal and state governments for the protection of individuals. State sovereignty is not just an end in itself: 'Rather, federalism secures to citizens the liberties that derive from the diffusion of sovereign power'" (emphasis added). 10, available at: http://sustainabilityconference2012.worldeconomicsassociation.org/wpcontent/uploads/WEASustainabilityConference2012_Liodakis.pdf (noting how "Marx's fruitful insight led him to depict the relation between nature and society as a metabolic relation increasingly disrupted by the development of capitalism, both in agriculture and industry […] . This insight has served as the basis for a considerable recent literature concerning this growing metabolic rift and its implications for a sustainable and ecologically compatible development.
[…] As argued throughout this paper, however, due to the essential features of capitalism, it is impossible to have reforms of capitalism adequate to the task of creating conditions of social and ecological sustainability, not to speak of a truly sustainable human development.") 11 See, e.g., Anthony Giddens, The 
